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ADVANOBMBNTS.

The statute law in Arkansas provides that the value of personal estate advanced shall be estimated according to its value
Time at wbicb at the time it is advanced, when no receipt speciValue Fixed fying its value has been given. Nevertheless the
Supreme Court of the State, in Culberhouse v. Culberhouse,
59 S. W. 38, where the property advanced consisted of a
horse and a life-insurance policy, while applying the rule to
the horse, holds that as to the insurance policy the estimate
should be as of the time when the right of possession or
beneficial interest accrued. The court regards this rule as
in consonance with equity, and to be presumed from the facts
of the case as the intention of the father. A fortio that
would seem a proper holding where there is no such statute
as above noted.
APPEAL.

In Southwestern Telegraph and Telephone Co. v. Galveston
County, 59 S. W. 589, it appeared that the lower court had
Destruction entered judgment commanding the defendant to
of SubJect- remove from the plaintiff's bridge across Galvesflatter, Costs ton Bay its wires and structures placed thereon,
and enjoining further use thereof. Both the bridge and the
wires and structures were destroyed by the great storm of
September 8, i9oo. An appeal having been taken to the Court
of Civil Appeals it was held that the appellate court would not
entertain the appeal merely to determine costs. In such case
the court holds the proper practice is to dismiss the casenot the appeal-the effect of which is to annul the judgment
below.
ARCHITECT'S LIEN.
It is held in Johnson v. McClure, 62 Pac. 983, by the Supreme Court of New Mexico, that an architect who prepares
Preparing plans and specifications for a building, and superPlans,
intends the construction of such building in acsuperintend. cordance with the plans, has a lien for his services,
lng Building both in preparing the plans and specifications and
98
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ARCHITECT'S LIEN (Continued).

Bodily toil in the
in superintending such construction.
form of manual labor "is not in all cases," says the court,
"necessary to entitle to a lien." Bank v. Gries, 35 Pa. 423, is
cited as in accord. The court says a different doctrine obtains
where the architect merely furnishes plhn, but dbe§ not superintend. Of course the lien falls in the class of statutory
liens, but exhibits the construction of such statutes.
BILLS AND NOTES.

In Eccles v. Herrick,62 Pac. IO4O, the Court of Appeals of
Colorado holds that a stipulation in a note to pay interest at
the rate prevailing at the place of contract is valid,
Rate of
thotigh exceeding the rate allowable at the place
Interest,
what Law

of payment.

And further, that a note stipula-

ting for additional interest, not exceeding the
legal rate, in case of default in the payment of interest, is
not an agreement for a penalty, but a valid agreement to pay
ka higher rate on a contingency.
Governs

CONFESSIONS.

In Whitley v. State, 28 Southern, 852, it appeared that the
defendant, accused of murder, had confessed, under the inInvoluntary, fluence of threats to deliver him to a mob, that
Corroborated he had murdered the deceased and had taken from
him a sack of money which he had put at a cerby Facts
tain place. Search being made at that place the money was
found. Nevertheless the Supreme Court of Mississippi holds
this part of the confession, as well as the rest, inadmissiblea holding apparently at variance with the usual rule, that facts
discovered in consequence of a confession improperly obtained
and so much of the confession as relates thereto may be
received.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The charter of Kansas City authorized the city to apportion
a special paving assessment on the abutting property owners
in proportion to the frontage of their property.
An ordinance authorizing the paving of a street
Proaeg
Property
Assessment with asphalt and the levy of a special assessment
for Paving according to the front-foot rule was regularly
passed, and the street was paved and the assessStreet
ment made in strict conformity thereto, and no fraud was
practiced. The abutting property owner claimed that this

. 10
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amounted to a taking of property without due process of law
and hence was violative of the National Constitution. But
the Supreme Court of Missouri held in Barber Asphalt Paving Company v. French, 58 S. W. 934, that such assessment
was in accordance with a just and equitable rule and was not
void. The case of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, is discussed at length by the court, and distinguished on its facts;
as there the abutting owner was assessed for the value of the
land taken from herself in order to open a new street.
An act passed in Tennessee in 1899 imposed a privilege tax
on all merchandis6 brokers selling to consumers within the
state on orders or samples. In Stoddardv. MrBroker's
P'riviegeTax, gan, 58 S. W. io6i, it was sought to enforce this
Interstate statute against brokers who negotiated sales excluCommerce sively for firms without the state and the Supreme
Court of Tennessee allows it. It is difficult, if not impossible,
to reconcile this case with the case of Brennan v. Titusville,
153 U. S. 289(1894),in the U.S. Supreme Court. The court
relies for its decision on Ficklen v. Taxing District, 145 U. S.
i, but that case is easily distinguished, as is done by the court
in Brennan v. Titusville.
An Ohio statute having first defined a tramp, prescribes
special penalties against tramps who do not immediately leave
a
Tramp Law a dwelling-house, or yard or inclosure about
dwelling-house, when requested by the owner to
do so, or who are found carrying a firearm or other dangerous
weapon. In State v. Hogan, 58 N. E. 572, the Supreme Court
of the state holds that the act does not deprive any persons
of the equal protection of the laws and is not violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. The
case proceeds on the theory that tramps as a class need
-special legislation in relation to the provisions of the act; and
granting the court the truth of its picture of the "genus
tramp," the holding is undoubtedly sound.
-CONTRACTS.

The Texas Anti-Trust Law, a well-known statute in consequence of its drastic provisions, is applied by the Court of
.Combinations Civil Appeals of that state in the case of Comer v.
In Restraint Burton-Lingo Co., 58 S. W. 969. In that case an
of Trade. owner, on selling his business and good-will to
certain firms, agreed not to re-enter such business within a
specified time in a certain place; and it appeared that these
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CONTRACTS (Continued).
firms were the only dealers in such business in such place, and
had combined to buy such business and good-will to prevent
competition and to control prices. Under these facts the court
held that such agreement, though valid at common law-in its
view, was void under the anti-trust law, which makces aft cofftracts void where a combination of capital or skill of two or
more persons is formed to create or carry out restrictions in
trade, or to prevent competition in the sale or purchase of
commodities.
In New York, too, we find a recent decision adhering to old
rules in spite of modem economic tendencies. In Cummings
v. Union Bluestone Co., 58 N. E. 525, it appeared that producers controlling 90 per cent of the total production of bluestone agreed to sell through a single agency and to distribute
profits according to a schedule agreed upon. They claimed
that they had been earning profits merely nominal, in consequence of the severity of competition, and were compelled to
this resort to obtain reasonable prices. Nevertheless the court
holds the contract void, as "it gave them power to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices." And this, too, though the
article dealt in was not a commodity of prime necessity.
In Harmanv. Anderson, 62 Pac. 961, the plaintiff had purchased a bicycle of the defendant, and shortly afterward reReceipt to be turned it to the defendant, who took it, giving the
plaintiff a receipt for $6o, to apply on any new
Accepted
uponPurchase wheel that the plaintiff might select from his

stock. Subsequently the plaintiff selected a new wheel
and offered the receipt in part payment, but the defendant
refused to honor it. Under these circumstances the Court of
Appeals of Colorado holds that since the defendant has refused
to comply with the plaintiff's demand, or recognize his obligation under the contract, he is liable for $6o in money.
CRIMINAL LAW.
The disinclination of the courts to give a fixed definition to
what constitutes a reasonable doubt appears again in the MisReasonable sissippi case of Klyce v. State, 28 Southern, 827.
Doubt
In this case, on a prosecution for manslaughter, the
trial court told the jury that a reasonable doubt is one for
which "a reason can be given." The Supreme Court holds
this instruction erroneous, saying that the juror should be
allowed to apply his own conception of what constitutes a
reasonable doubt.
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"When the death of the woman is charged as an element of
the offence [i. e., abortion] necessary to be proved in order to
establish against the accused the graver crime and
Dying
Declarations,

Abortion

subject him to the severer punishment, her dying
declarations are legal evidence." State v. Meyer,

47 At. 486 (N. J.). The court admits the existence of diverse
decisions on this point.
In People v. Marrs,84 N. W. 284, it is held by the Supreme
Court of Michigan that the defendant may be convicted of an
assault to commit rape, though the jury may find
Intent to
that the complainant did not resist sufficiently to
Commit Rape render the offence rape, provided he assaulted her
Assault with

with intent to have intercourse with her against her will, by
using whatever force might prove necessary.
Just how far the deliberations of a jury can be investigated
and their verdict impeached because of their own irregular
conduct, usually presents serious difficulty. In Texas, the
Conduct
of Jury,
New Trial

code provides that a defendant shall be entitled to
a new trial where the jury, after retiring, receives
other testimony. In Ysaguirre v. State, 58 S. W.

1005, this provision was held to authorize a new trial where,
while the jury was deliberating, one juryman told another,
who was holding out for acquittal, that the defendant had
served a term in the penitentiary. The court regarded this
evidence, though not legally relevant, sufficiently material to
be calculated to influence the verdict of the jury. And the
court further held that these facts might be shown by the
affidavit of a juror, which was sufficient evidence thereof.
In Roberts v. Wells, 62 Pac. 892, the Supreme Court of
Utah holds that "in no case can a judgment for a fine, coupled
Fine and

with imprisonment until the fine is paid, be enforced,

imprisonment when the same judgment and sentence provide for

an independent express term of imprisonment."

DAMAG-S.

The United States Supreme Court holds in Sigafus v. Porter,
21 Sup. C. R. 34, that the measure of damages in an action
Me.s.re of for deceit in the sale of property is not the differDamages in ence between the value of the property as it
Cases of Deceit proved to be and as it would have been if as

represented, but is the difference between the real value of the
property at the date of the sale and the price paid, with in-
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terest thereon, together with such outlays as were legitimately attributable to the defendant's conduct. This is on
the ground that the defendant is bound to make good the loss
sustained, but not the expected fruits of an unrealized .speculation. A number of decisions of state courts are Cited as in

accord, among them those of Pennsylvania: HigA v. Berret,
148 Pa. 263; and also this is said to be the English view:
Peek v. Derry, L. R., 37 Ch. Div. 541, 591 ; but the court ad-

mits decisions exist holding the opposite view.
In an action to recover for the death of the plaintiff's son, the

court told the jury that damages might be given in compensation for the loss of his society. But on appeal the
Death by
Wrongfui Act Supreme Court of California holds the instruction
erroneous; that "it is essentially and alone pecuniary loss to
the parent, which he may recover in damages for the death of
his child: Wales v. Pacific Electric Motor Co., 62 Pac. 932.
Mere evidence of the number of visits of a physician is not
enough to authorize a jury in an action for personal injuries to pass on the value of the services.
Carterv. Village of Nunda, 66 N. Y. Supp. iO59.
Physlcian',s
Services

DEEDS.

In Taft v. Simpson, 84 N. W. 77, the Supreme Court of
Michigan holds that where a deed is valid at common law,
Acknowledgment After
Death of

Grantor

the fact that the notary did not sign the acknowledgment till after the grantor's death does not invalidate it; and so also when the revenue stamps

are not affixed until after the grantor's death,

such delay occurring through no fraudulent intent, the deed
is good.
The well-known rule that the true consideration for a deed
may be shown by parol evidence, though it contradicts the
deed, is adhered to by the Court of Civil Appeals
Parol
Evidence, if Texas, against the dissent of the chief justice,
Covenant ina case involving strong considerations against
Against
the application of the rule. In Jolmson v. Elmer,
Incumbrances 59 S. W. 605, the plaintiff had conveyed land to

the defendant, receiving one tract in exchange subject to a
vendor's lien. The plaintiff agreed to assume its payment,
but requested that mention of the lien be omitted in the deed.
A deed covenanting againstincumbranceswas accordingly prepared, making no mention of the lien. It was held admissible
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to show that part of the consideration was the assumption of
the lien, though it contradicted the covenant against incumbrances. The court admits that "the weight of authority is
probably in support of the appellant's contention," i. e., that
the evidence should be excluded; but finding the question an
open one in Texas, it regards the other view as the better.
CONTEMPT.

In Michigan an act provided that the trial court might
punish by fine and imprisonment for certain acts as contempt,
Avoiding
"and for any other unlawful interference with the
Service of

process or proceedings in any action," and in all
other cases where proceedings for contempt had
been usually adopted in courts of record to enforce the remedies or protect the rights of any parties. Under this act the
Supreme Court of the State, in Broderick v. Genesee Circuit
Judge, 84 N. W. 129, holds that a person who concealed himself to prevent the service of a subpcena in a civil case was
not guilty of contempt. The court distinguishes cases which
are urged against this holding, as having reference to where
one has sought to induce another to remain away, whether
that other had been subpcened or not. The cases are very
similar, but the court adheres to the rule that penal statutes
must be strictly construed.
Subpcna

On the other hand, the line between contempt proceedings
and criminal prosecutions is continually being drawn in new
Retroactive
statute

cases.
Thus in Judd v. Judd, 84 N. W. 134
(Mich.), we have a case which bears an exceedAllowing
ingly close resemblance to an ex Post facto law
Punishment increasing the punishment after the crime has
for Contempt been committed; nevertheless the statute is upheld.
In that case, the plaintiff had obtained a divorce from the defendant and a decree for $75 per month alimony. Subsequently the divorced husband refused to pay more than $5o
per month. Then the legislature enacted that courts might
punish by fine and imprisonment refusals to comply with the
order of court for the payment of alimony; and this act was
held to be applicable to the case of the defendant in this case
and constitutional when so applied.
EVIDENCE.

The common law rule that a person who did not believe in
the existence of a God was incompetent to testify is well
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EVIDENCE (Continued.)
known, but its application at the present time
seems to have lately been called in question rather
frequently.
The Constitution of Kansas provides that no
person shall be "incompetent to testify on account of religious
belief." Construing this, the Court of Appeals holds that it
abrogates the old rule of the common law, a person who
does not believe in the existence of a God is competent:
Dickinson v. Beal,62 Pac. 724. The language of the Constitution easily, and perhaps naturally, will allow an interpretation that does not affect the rule of the common law, namely,
that there is to be no discrimination on account of religious
belief as to the competency of witnesses. The language seems
to presuppose the presence of some form of religious belief
and not to contemplate its entire absence. The decision shows,
therefore, a rather marked readiness to depart from the old rule,
a readiness which, it seems, is appearing in other jurisdictions.
competency
of Witness

In Roberts v. Greig, 62 Pac. 574, the Court of Appeals of
Colorado holds that where the parties to a note agree at the
Parolmviene time of making it that it shall be paid from the
- to Vary a
proceeds of a certain mill, and that, if there are no
Written
proceeds, the note shall be returned and destroyed,
contract
parol evidence of such agreement, and that there
were no proceeds, is admissible in an action by an indorsee after
maturity against the maker. The basis for this decision is
stated to be that "the completed delivery of the note was only
to happen in the event the mill ran, and the money was gotten
out of the operation." The court assumes this position with
undisguised reluctance, but regards itself bound by former
decisions.
The Supreme Court of Utah in -ann v. Rio Grande W. Ry.
Co., 62 Pac. 9o8, holds that the general rule of evidence that
affirmative testimony is of a higher character and of
Affirmative
and Negative greater weight than negative testimony is subject
Testimony
to two exceptions: (I) When "negative witnesses," who are credible, and who were in a position where
they could readily see and hear what transpired, and directed
their attention thereto, testify that they did not see or hear the
occurrence testified to by the "affirmative witnesses "; and
when (2) negative witnesses who are credible, and were in a
position where they could readily see and hear what transpired, and directed their attention thereto, testify positively
that the occurrences testified to by the affirmative witnesses
did not happen. These rules the court applies to the ques-
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fion of whether the bell of a train had been rung and the
whistle blown, and holds error an instruction of the court
below that the positive testimony in the case was of a higher
character than the negative testimony.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.

Ejectment was brought by A. against B. on a deed from B.
to A. B. set up as a defence that he had executed the deed
for the purpose of hindering and delaying, if not
Right o
Grantor to defeating his creditors. But the Court of Appeals
Plead Fraud of Kentucky, in Elmore v. Elmore, 58 S. W. 980,
held that the grantor in a deed could not resist the recovery
of the land by the grantee on this ground, since the contract
was executed and not executory.

INJUNCTION.

A rather remarkable injunction is sustained by the Supreme
Court of New York County, N. Y., in Stevenson v. Pucci,66
N. Y. Supp. 712. The lower court had decreed,
Against
among other things, that the defendant, an emProfanity
ployer of Italian laborers, should be restrained from allowing his
men to use "loud and profane language when engaged on said
work, or otherwise, in front of plaintiff's premises or in the
hearing of persons therein," and this decree is, so far as this
part is concerned, affirmed.

INSURANCE.

In Metropolitan Life Insurance CO. v. Smith, 59 S. W. 24,
the Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds that where a wife,
Procured by without her husband's knowledge, procured insurWife on Hus- ance on his life, and paid therefor with money
band's Life which he had furnished her for household ex-

penses, he was entitled to recover the money paid, though the
company did not know that it belonged to him; and this in
spite of the fact that the husband required no account of the
wife for the money so furnished her. It might well be under
such circumstances that she was allowed to make out of such
fund expenditures for herself, and it seems to be going rather
jar to allow a recovery to the husband.
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In Ewing v. Rhea, 62 Pac. 790, the facts proved showed
that the defendant's grantors silently acquiesced in the conRevocability
when Acted

struction by the plaintiff, at considerable expense,
of an irrigating ditch across their lands. Baut the

Upon
Supreme Court of Oregon holds the right thereby
gained to be a mere license revocable at will, and that no action
lies against the defendant for cutting off the supply of water,
so long as the period of limitation has not elapsed, It admits
the rule to be different where consideration has been paid, or
the party has been encouraged "by any participation in a
common enterprise or induced by a definite oral agreement to
expend money in making permanent valuable improvements ";
but thinks this should not be extended to where the invasion
of another's right is acquiesced in.
MARRIAGE.

A. and B. cohabited together as man and wife and held each
other out as such. At the beginning of this relation A. had
impediments another wife living. Later this wife died and A.
subsequently

and B. continued their relation as before. Then A.,

the alleged husband, died, and B. sought to recover on an insurance policy as his wife. In Barkerv. Valenine, 84 N, W. 297, the Supreme Court of Michigan holds that
she may recover; that the holding out after the removal of
impediments, and the recognition of the parties as husband
and wife, will in such case as the present render the parties
husband and wife in the eye of the law on the ground that a
valid marriage will be presumed to have occurred after the
impediment was removed. Earlier Michigan cases, apparently
holding the opposite view, are distinguished on the ground
that in them the question arose between the parties to the
alleged marriage.
Removed

MASTER AND SERVANT.

In Kentucky the courts hold that "the master is responsible
for the negligence of his superior servant to one under his
control for an injury thereby caused him." In
FellowServants, flinois Central Railroad Co. v. Coleman, 59 S. W.
Negligence of 13, the Court of Appeals of the state holds this
Superior rule applicable where the superior was not at the
time acting merely as a director of the labor, but was himself
engaged with the laborer in operating a lever used in uncoupling cars; the court regarding it as making no difference
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whether the negligent act was done by his own hands or by
another under his orders.
A result almost, if not qyite, the opposite of this is reached
in the case of Ross v. Union Cement and Lime Co., 58 N. E.
5oo, by the Appellate Court of Indiana. In that case the
plaintiff was employed in removing rock from the floor of defendant's tunnel, and a large stone was thrown in the tunnel
by blasting, and the loose rock surrounding and supporting
such stone formed the material on which the plaintiff and
others were engaged, and the act of one of such employes,
who was tunnel boss, caused the large rock to fall on the
plaintiff, injuring him, for which injury suit was brought. The
court holds that judgment should be given for the defendant,
since the tunnel boss in such employment was a fellow-servant
of the plaintiff and was not charged with the great substantive
duties of the master, for the exercise of which by such viceprincipal or superior servant the master would have remained
liable.
RES GEST4.

How closely the declarations must be connected with the
actual occurrence which is the subject of the issue seems a
Declarations
Alter

question of ever-recurring difficulty.

No standard

of time, apparently, solves the various phases
Regaining which the facts assume. Thus in MissouriK. &
Consciousness T. Ry. Co. v. Moore, 59 S. W., 282, the witness had
been rendered unconscious in consequence of a railroad accident, and did not recover consciousness for about twelve hours.
Yet the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas holds that what he
then said was admissible as part of resgeste.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

The ordinary rule that the payment in whole or in part of
the purchase money is not such a part performance as will
justify the court in avoiding the Statute of Frauds
Parol
Contract, Part and decreeing specific performance, where the
Performance contract is not evidenced by a writing, is slightly
modified in the case of Jorgenson v. Jorgenson, 84 N. W. 221.
In that case there was not the evidence required by the
statute, but the court decrees specific performance, and the
basis of its decision is that the purchase money was paid
more than six years previously, and that hence to refuse
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specific performance would work great hardship on the proposed vendor, since his action to recover it back would be
barred by the Statute of Limitations. Some improvements had
been made by the plaintiff, but. this is not made a basis of the
decision, since, the court says, "the use-of the land during the
time since the contract was entered into more than compen-

sated plaintiff for all improvements made thereon, and he can
claim no particular loss or injury because of such improvements."

So in Clancy v. Flusky, 58 N. E. 594, it is held that an
agreement of a father to give his farm to his sons if they
would move upon it, cultivate and improve it, and furnish him
a home with them, will be enforced, they having done their
part, though he, without sufficient cause, went away; and the
court holds that there is sufficient part performance to
order the contract specifically performed, though the Statute
of Frauds has not been complied with. One judge dissents
without assigning any reasons.
STREET RAILWAYS.

A passenger on a street car is entitled not only to time to
step off, but also to time to clear her skirts, where they catch
on an appliance on the platform. "It is the duty
Timeto
of the conductor to see that she is clear from any
Alight
such attachment before he starts the car. If he starts before
he knows that she is thus free, it is a negligent method of
starting and he takes the chances ": Smith v. Kingston City
R. Co., 67 N. Y. Supp. 185.
A street-railway company is liable for damages resulting
in consequence of its failure to keep its tracks in safe condition, though they may have been laid in a manner perfectly
Dty - to safe and their subsequent unsafe character be due
to the sinking of the street: Groves v. Louisville
Repair
of Streets Ry. Co., 58 S.W. 5o8 (Ky.). This liability exists
notwithstanding the municipality is also responsible for the
safety of the streets, and arises out of the continuing duty of the
street-railway company to see to it that its tracks do not become
a source of danger.
SUBSURFACE WATER.

The question as to the right to sink wells and pump water
to such an extent as to injure lands of others, arises in the

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

SUBSURFACR WATER (Continued).

New York case of Forbellv. City of New York, 58
N.E. 644. In that case owners of land making
merchandise of large quantities of water, drew this water
from wells located on their own land. These they had
sunk, aware, "at least to a business certainty," that they
were sinking them in such a place as to exhaust the supply
for neighboring land to a considerable distance around. This
was the effect; and the result of the operation being that the
neighboring owners could not grow crops thereon, an injunction is brought by them to restrain such use of the wells, and
the injunction is granted by the Court of Appeals. The court
recognises the old cases as to the unrestricted right to the use
of percolating waters, but regards the knowledge of the defendants as to the nature of the flow of the subsurface water
as an element which renders inapplicable former decisions
allowing unrestricted enjoyment of percolating water.
Right al

Lndowner

TAX SALE.

An exception to the ordinary rule that a tenant may not
deny his landlord's title during the tenancy seems to be laid
Purchase by down by the Supreme Court of Kansas in the

Tenant
case of Smith v. Newman, 62 Pac. IoI i. In that
case A., the tenant, got a conveyance from a third.party
who had gotten a tax deed for the property, which had
been sold for taxes, and later another tax deed for further
taxes which were in default was issued to A. He refused after
securing the first deed to pay rent, and ejectment being brought
by B., the landlord, he set up this title, and the defence is
allowed by the court, holding that "a tenant under no obligation or duty to pay taxes may purchase" the property at a
tax sale made during his term, and resist recovery by his
former landlord for rent accruing after the tax sale, by virtue
of an adverse title so acquired."
TRIAL.

Some recollections of the old rules in regard to juries and
their oversight by the court were apparently in the mind of
the trial judge in the case of Fairbanks,Morse & Co. v. Weeber,
Powero court 62 Pac. 368.

At four o'clock on the second day

OveeJury after the submission of the case he called in the
jury and told them they would be confined till the following
Tuesday morning (it being then Saturday) unless they agreed
on a verdict, and would not receive more than one meal a day.
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TRIAL (Continued).
This seems to have had a beneficent influence in reconciling
the different opinions of the jurors, but the Court of Appeals
of Colorado holds it reversible error, as an indirect means of
compelling a verdict. The court, however, expressly reserves
its opinion as to its holding in case a jury were treated in the
way threatened, provided no threat was actually made. Apparently it regards this a totally distinct question, the making
of the threat being, it seems, the turning point.
TRUSTS.
How much notice is necessary to the cestui que trust upon
the creation of the trust seems, like the question of the necessity for an acceptance of a deed, to recur continually. In
Undisclosed Robertson v. ilfcCartlzy, 66 N. Y. Supp. 327, it is
Deposit
again flatly presented, and the court decides it is
not necessary that the cestui que trust should know of the
creation of the trust. In that case A. deposited money in his
own name, "in trust for B., brother." B. knew nothing ot
this. Upon A.'s death, B. was held entitled to the fund. It is
held that the trust, if so intended, is irrevocable from the time
of the deposit, and proof of the fact that depositor subsequently withdrew some for his own use (as in this case) does
not show a different intention nor defeat the trust.
TRUSTES.
In Parmenterv. Barstow, 47 Atl. 365, the Supreme Court
of Rhode Island holds that though trustees who have the full
Liability for legal title to land have the ordinary duties and
Negligence In liabilities which are incident to the ownership of
Repair of real estate, and consequently the duty to keep the
Sidewalk
sidewalk in repair, nevertheless recovery cannot
be had against them in their official capacity for the negligence
of their servants in the repair of such sidewalk. This is on
the ground that the law will not allow trust property to be
impaired by the trustee's negligence.
WILLS.
In Ametrano v. Downs, 67 N. Y. Supp. 128, the Supreme
Court of Kings County holds that where the testatrix had
devised her interest in real estate in fee, and afterDevise,
condemnation ward and before her death the land was taken
of Estate under eminent domain proceedings, the devisee
was not, on the death of the testatrix, entitled to the moneys
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received by the testatrix as damages, since the condemnation
revoked the devise. The court holds the same rule applicable
as in the case of a voluntary sale.
The conflicting interests of life tenant and remainderman in
real property were at a pretty early period of the common law
Life Tenant's thoroughly worked out. But with the subsequent
Interest In
allowance of future interests in personalty similar
Personalty
questions arose which still form the issue in no
small number of cases. In In re Chapman, 66 N. Y. Supp.
235, a testator gave the income of his estate to his wife for
life and provided that an investment in a certain steamship be
continued. The right of the wife to the profits (and not
merely to interest) seems not to have been contested, and thus
the difficulty in the English case of Brawn v. Gellatly, L. R., 2
Chan. App. 751 (I867), was avoided. It will be remembered
that there the executors were to sail the ships until a suitable
time for selling and the income was held to be capital, the
life tenant being allowed only interest. But in the case in
hand the executor claimed the right to hold back part of the
property in order to provide against depreciation in the value
of the ship. It was held that this was not allowable, but that
the widow was entitled to all. The court proceeds not so
much on the general rules governing the extent of life
tenant's interest in personalty, as on the ground that this was
the intention of the testator.
A similar question arose in Massachusetts in the case of
D' Ooge v. Leeds, 57 N. E. 1025. In that case part of the
property devised consisted of shares in a joint-stock company
which at that time had in its possession a fund used according
to its rules for the payment of losses and the protection of
stockholders from personal liability for debts. Thereafter
bonds were issued to the stockholders on such accumulated
fund and interest paid on bonds only from such proceeds of
the reserve as should be applicable after making provision for
the payment of all debts of the company. As between the
claims of the life-tenant and the remaindermen to these bonds
the court held for the latter, regarding the bonds as capital.
The court enters into a discussion of the difference between
principal and income, and refers to the confusion in the
English cases on this subject, but holds that in Massachusetts
the rule is well established and everything is made to turn
upon the action of the corporation, the law regarding "cash
dividends, however large, as income, and stock dividends,
however made, as capital." This also is the rule in the United
States Supreme Court: Gillons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549.
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In Currierv. Currier, 47 Atl. 94, the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire inclines to a somewhat unusual view as to a
specific bequest. In that case the testator devised
Specific
"one-third part of all my real estate in the city of
Bequests
F." to his wife; and also "one-third of my personal property
of which I may die possessed." The first provision is held to
be clearly a specific devise, and the second the court is prepared
to believe is a specific legacy on analogous principles, but
avoids a decision of the point by basing its construction of the
will on its conception of the intention of the testator.
Where it came out in proponent's testimony that testatrix
was an invalid and much enfeebled, and some other facts
tending to raise the question of testamentary
Burdenof
Proof a to capacity, it was held by the Surrogate's Court of
Testamentary Suffolk County, New York, that the burden is on
him to show not merely execution, but he must
Capacity
show testamentary capacity, and unless he does probate will
be denied: In re Dt Castro's Will, 66 N. Y. Supp. 239.

